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Abstract
Buyers frequently delegate purchase decisions to sellers who are better informed about supply
options and the cost of service. This paper analyzes how buyers optimally contract with sellers
who vary in their expertise at prescribing service. We show that the most expert suppliers oﬀer
the greatest variation in advice. Buyers beneﬁt from dealing with experts provided they contract
sequentially whereby terms are negotiated gradually as the supplier acquires information.
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Procurers of goods and services frequently delegate their purchase decisions to suppliers.
There are several explanations for this behavior. It may be necessary for buyers to rely
on suppliers to recommend credence goods, which consumers are not qualiﬁed to evaluate.
((see Biglaiser (1993), Emmons (1997), Taylor (1995) and Wolinski (1993). Still, buyers
often delegate to suppliers, the purchases of experience goods, which they can evaluate.
This arises because sellers are better informed than buyers about the availability and cost
of diﬀerent supply options. For instance a home owner may consult an insurance agent to
proscribe the type and level of coverage to insure against theft, ﬁre, and accidental damage.
Or, a procurer of communication services for a large corporation may rely on an information
technology expert to estimate costs and recommend services to establish communication
within the corporation.
While delegation of purchase decisions is useful, it does pose some problems for the
procurer. For instance, the buyer may be unable to observe the supplier’s expertise at fore-
casting cost. Further, the buyer may be unable to assess the accuracy of the supplier’s
forecast ex post, if he can’t observe the supplier’s actual costs. Added to this is the pos-
sibility that a privately informed supplier may recommend service to maximize his proﬁts
rather than the buyer’s surplus. One often proscribed remedy is to separate the diagnosis
from the supply of service. This rarely occurs in practice, though, as separating tasks damp-
ens incentives for the expert to make accurate prescriptions of service. Another reason is
that prescribing and supplying service may be complementary and therefore more costly to
perform independently.
This paper is motivated by the following questions. How do procurers contract with
suppliers who privately know their abilities to forecast cost and to prescribe service? What
devices and sequence of negotiation, are used to induce suppliers to provide accurate esti-
mates of supply costs and to prescribe services most beneﬁcial for the buyer? When suppliers
have similar but uncertain costs, what is the buyer’s preference for contracting with experts
who vary in their ability to forecast future costs of supply?
To address these questions we extend the existing incentive contracting model to settings
where the supplier’s private information at contracting time is his ability to predict the
eventual costs of supply. Starting with the seminal analysis of Baron and Myerson (1982),
most studies focus on contracting with sellers who are perfectly and privately informed at
1t h et i m et h e yc o n t r a c t 1. In contrast we model a setting where suppliers are privately, but
imperfectly informed of their costs at the time of contracting. We assume suppliers diﬀer in
their expertise at forecasting costs, and they privately know their forecasting ability at the
time of contracting. We model a sequential contracting process, where the supplier chooses
terms gradually over time as as he receives more accurate forecasts of cost. Based on these
forecasts the supplier prescribes a quantity of service for the buyer to purchase.
Our analysis begins by deﬁning what constitutes expertise in forecasting. Since all sup-
pliers are presumed to draw their costs from the same distribution, they are distinguished
only by the forecast of costs that they receive. Intuitively it seems that forecasts that track
or systematically vary with actual costs are more accurate. When forecasts are relatively
constant and invariant to actual costs, sellers are unable to adjust their supply decisions to
take advantage of better cost information. Our ﬁndings conﬁrm this intuition in the follow-
ing sense. We ﬁnd sellers prefer receiving more varied forecasts that enable them to earn
greater surplus for any given supply contract. This ranking provides an ordering of forecast
structures satisfying Rothschild’s and Stiglitz’s (1970) mean preserving spread. That is, for
a given distribution of actual costs, suppliers prefer one frequency of forecasts to another if
it is a mean preserving spread.
To the extent that buyers delegate purchases to sellers, one might naturally presume
buyers beneﬁt from expert advice. After all, experts can prescribe more eﬃcient levels of
services to the buyer. But, they command greater information rents from buyers in return.
What we ﬁnd is that the buyer’s ability to beneﬁtf r o me x p e r ta d v i c ed e p e n d so nt h e
contracting sequence employed. When all contract terms are negotiated after the expert has
observed his forecast, the buyer may beneﬁtl i t t l eo rn o ta ta l lb yt h i sa d v i c e .A ni n f o r m e d
seller may extract too much rent for the buyer to beneﬁt from his superior advice. However
when contract terms are determined gradually as the expert acquires information about
supply conditions, we ﬁnd the buyer always beneﬁts from dealing with expert sellers.
The buyer’s ability to beneﬁt from expert advice depends on the supply contract he
employs to delegate purchases. We demonstrate below, that the buyer optimally oﬀers
diﬀerent supply contracts to sellers with varying expertise. Interestingly we discover, that
the contracts diﬀer by the amount of decision authority the supplier is delegated. Under the
expert supply arrangement the seller is free to select the eﬃcient level of service based on his
forecast of cost. In contrast, under the non expert supply agreement, the seller’s ability to
adjust supply to his forecast of costs is constrained by the buyer. Oﬀering diﬀerent contracts
1 See Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) for a comprehensive review of this literature.
2with varying degrees of delegation authority, allows the buyer to screen suppliers by their
ability to forecast. Naturally the expert prefers the contract with the greatest delegation
authority. This screening of suppliers is precluded of course, when sellers already know their
forecast before contracting begins.
Before proceeding we indicate how our ﬁndings relate to previous work. At a general level
this study relates to the large and growing literature on delegation in agency relationships.
Early papers in this area by Holmstrom (1984) and Armstrong (1994) analyze how to opti-
mally delegate decisions to an exogenously endowed expert whose preferences are imperfectly
aligned with the principal. These studies show in the absence of payments, it is desirable to
conﬁne experts’ decisions to certain areas. Our analysis extend these studies by considering
how payment provisions, along with decision restrictions may improve delegation. Aghion
and Tirole (1997) and Szalay (2002) consider settings where an agent’s expertise is acquired.
They describe how the degree of decision authority aﬀorded the agent determines an expert’s
acquisition of information. Our analysis shows in a procurement setting, it is the targeting
of compensation to supply levels that determines incentives for sellers to acquire expertise.
More closely related to our analysis are several recent papers that investigate informa-
tion acquisition in procurement environments. Cremer and Khalil (1992) and Cremer et al
(1998a) analyze how supply contracts are modiﬁed to mitigate the acquisition of non pro-
ductive information by sellers to increase their bargaining power. Our analysis, in contrast
focuses on the acquisition of productive knowledge that is useful for prescribing service to
buyers. In this respect our analysis is most closely related to recent studies by Cremer et
al (1998b), Lewis and Sappington (1993a,b, 1994, 1997) and Sobel (1993). Together these
papers examine how contracts are designed to accommodate diﬀerently informed agents as
well as to manage the acquisition of information by these agent.2 Our analysis studies sim-
ilar issues, but in settings that incorporate more general information structures and allow
for sequential contract negotiations. We show that allowing for variations in the timing
of contract negotiations and partial information acquisition leads to very diﬀerent analy-
sis of supply agreements with distinct implications for how buyers value expert advice, as
compared to previous studies.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out our general model
2 In a related study, Crocker and Snow (1992) investigate the question of how to ration information to
agents, to prevent them from wasteful signalling of their abilities in the marketplace.
3 Coutry and Li (2000) and Riordan and Sappington (1987) similarly investigate sequential contracting,
where agents are assigned diﬀerent contracts depending on their privately known distributions of preferences.
The expertise of the agent, however, is not an issue in these analyses.
3and demonstrates supplier preferences for variable forecasts. In section 3 we characterize
optimal supply contracts. We demonstrate the optimality of limited delegation contracts
that limit the decision authority of non expert suppliers. The preferences of procurers for
dealing with expert forecasters is studied in Section 4. There we also examine procurer
preferences for informing suppliers about their forecasting ability. Section 5 concludes with
a summary of results and thoughts for extensions.
2M o d e l
2.1 Description of Buyer and Expert Suppliers
A risk-neutral buyer, B, contracts with a risk neutral seller, S, to obtain some quantity (or
quality) ,q≥ 0, of a good or service. The buyer’s known valuation for the product, V (q), is
an increasing and strictly concave function of q. The buyer’s net surplus from the purchase
is W = V (q) − T,w h e r eT is B0s payment to S.
A seller’s actual cost of supplying q ≥ 0 is C(x,q)=xC (q),w h e r ex ∈ X =[ x,x] is a
shift parameter that determines cost. Possible interpretations of x a r et h a ti ti sa ni n d e x
of the materials cost, or a measure of the diﬃculty of designing the required good which
determines production cost. We assume C (q) is smooth with C0(q) > 0,C 00(q) ≥ 0, and
C(0) ≥ 0 .
Sellers draw their cost parameter, x, from the same increasing, absolutely continuous
distribution G(x). Since all sellers draw their actual costs from the same distribution, they
all have the same ex ante expected cost of supply for any output level where ˆ x = EXx
is the ex ante expected unit cost. However, sellers diﬀer exogenously in their ability to
predict supply costs. We assume each seller observes a signal denoted by ˜ x ⊂ X =[ x,x].
The signal observed is the conditional expected value of costs so that ˜ x = E(x | ˜ x).4 A
seller’s information structure is given by Fi (˜ x | x) which is his signal distribution conditional
on actual cost, x. The seller’s marginal distribution of signals Fi (˜ x)=EXFi (˜ x | x) is
computed using G(x) the prior distribution of costs. The signal distribution may be discrete,
continuous, or mixed, so we denote dF i (˜ x) as the density or probability mass at ˜ x.
A seller’s ability to forecast is characterized by the distribution of signals, Fi (˜ x),he
receives. At the time of contracting S privately knows what distribution, Fi(˜ x), he has
4 This is without loss of generality, provided it is possible to compute the expected value of x conditional
on observing any informative signal z.
4inherited, where Fi i sd r a w nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yµi ≥ 0 from the set of possible distributions
{Fi()}i=1,...,N.F o rt h em o s tp a r tw ea s s u m eN =2 , implying a seller may either be an
"expert" or "non expert" denoted by Se or Sn, respectively. Below we specify the relationship
between Fe (˜ x) and Fn (˜ x) that deﬁnes the seller’s degree of expertise.
To complete our model, we specify the timing and contractual relation between B and
S as follows: (1) S privately learns his distribution Fi(˜ x). (2) B oﬀers S a set of contract
menus Mi = {Ti(˜ x),qi(˜ x)} for i = e,n conditioned on the seller’s type i and his eventual
forecast, ˜ x. (3) Each seller Si selects his preferred menu Mi given his private knowledge of
Fi.( 4 )Si observes his forecast, ˜ x, and selects a desired option (Ti(˜ x),qi(˜ x)) from Mi.( 5 )
Exchange occurs according to the contract terms.
Before proceeding we comment on some noteworthy features of our model. First, notice
we specify contracting as a sequential process. Sellers initially select a preferred supply
schedule based on private knowledge of their forecast ability. Later after observing their
forecast they choose an option from their supply schedule. This contrasts with most earlier
analyses that presume the supplier does not agree to the contract terms until after he has
privately observed all the information he can acquire.5 But, delaying agreement is clearly
detrimental to the buyer. His ability to bargain is diminished as the seller acquires more
information about cost. Consequently it seems most reasonable to presume buyers will
negotiate sequentially with sellers whenever possible. In some settings however, sequential
contracts may be precluded when the parties are unable to commit to long term agreements.6
The analysis to follow demonstrates the central importance of sequential contracting in
determining the willingness of buyers to delegate supply decision to experts.
Second, our current model assumes sellers’ forecast ability is exogenously. The possibility
that suppliers must invest to acquire expertise is examined in Sections 3 and 4. There we
demonstrate how inducing suppliers to acquire expertise may be easier when the corporate
buyer contracts out instead of obtaining services from divisions within the ﬁrm.
Third, we abstract from career concerns of forecasters in the current model. Later we
consider how suppliers may wish to manipulate their forecasts to give the appearance of
being an expert for future clients.
5 Exceptions are Courty and Li (2000) and Riordan and Sappington (1987) who also study sequential
contracting in procurement.
6 Chung (92) and Stole (92) discuss how the ability of parties to commit to long term agreements is
limited by constraints on ﬁnancial liability and legal provisions for contract breach.
52.2 Supplier Preferences for Information Structures
A contract, M = {T (˜ x),q(˜ x)}, consists of a payment-quantity pair for all ˜ x ∈ X. Notice
the contract is extended to cover all possible forecasts ˜ x ∈ X that the population of sellers
may observe, even though a particular supplier may observe only a subset of these forecasted
values. This permits us to readily compare diﬀerent forecast structures without a loss of
generality.
Each supplier Si is characterized by the information structure he inherits,Fi (˜ x).S is
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is Si0s net surplus under contract M given realization ˜ x. We say a supplier prefers one distri-
bution Fe to another Fn for the set of feasible contracts M,i fUe(M) ≥ Un(M) so that the
expected surplus is greater under Fe than Fn. The set of feasible contracts M imposes some
structure on the supplier’s surplus function allowing us to represent preferences for fore-
cast distributions in terms of well known stochastic dominance relations, as we demonstrate
below.
A contract is feasible (or implementible) provided it is incentive compatible and individu-
ally rational. Incentive compatibility requires the supplier to truthfully report his forecast so
that ˜ x0 =˜ x. Individual rationality requires Ui(M) ≥ 0 implying the seller agrees to supply
service under the contract terms.7 A well known characterization of feasible contracts is the
following:
Lemma 1:Ac o n t r a c tM is feasible if and only if,
(a) Ui
˜ x(˜ x | M)=−C(qi (˜ x)) ≤ 0
(b) qi(˜ x) is non increasing
(c) Ui(M) ≥ 0
7 Here we assume the supplier commits to ex ante terms of supply given in the menu M. In contrast, in
some settings an expost participation constraint may require Ui ¡
˜ x | Mi¢
≥ 0 for all ˜ x to insure the supplier’s
participation. In these instances, the procurer may collect an initail payment at the time of contracting to
compensate the buyer for the additional surplus it cedes to the supplier to satisfy ex post participation.
constraints.
6Proof: The proof, which follows standard arguments (see Fudenberg and Tirole(1991)), is
omitted.
According to Lemma 1 feasible contracting requires the supplier’s surplus, Ui (˜ x | M), to
be decreasing in ˜ x. A further property of the surplus function imposed by feasible contracting
is recorded in :
Lemma 2 Ui (˜ x | M) is convex in ˜ x for all feasible contracts M.
Proof: For all ˜ x0, ˜ x00 ∈ X and λ ∈ [0,1] we have,
U
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The inequality in the fourth line follows from noting the supplier selects contract terms
that maximize surplus for each ˜ x.Q E D
The intuition for this ﬁnding is as ˜ x increases, there is less than a proportionate increase
in the supplier’s cost. The seller responds to an expected cost increase by decreasing the
quantity supplied. Consequently, supplier surplus is decreasing in ˜ x at a decreasing rate,
meaning seller surplus is decreasing and convex in ˜ x.8
Given these properties of the surplus function one can rank distributions from the well
known mean preserving spread, stochastic dominance result of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
Recall, Fe is a mean preserving spread (MPS) of Fn if they have the same mean and
R x
x (Fe(˜ x) − Fn (˜ x))d˜ x ≥ 0 for all ˜ x ∈ ˙ X with strict inequality holding for some x ∈ X with
positive measure. It follows from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) that:
Lemma 3 Suppliers prefer Fe to Fn for all feasible contracts if and only if Fe is a mean
preserving spread of Fn
8 Scotchmer (1999) similarly has recognized and exploited the convexity property of agent’s surplus
functions in her discussion of optimal renewal of patents.
7The intuition underlying Lemma 3 comes from regarding the supply arrangement as a real
option. Recall, the seller’s surplus is a convex function of his forecasted cost. If one evaluates
sellers in terms of their information, those with the greatest variation in forecasts have the
highest option value. The expert forecaster is more likely to observe a signal that causes
him to revise initial expectation about cost. The expert optimally reduces production when
forecasts are high, and increases supply when forecasts are low.9 Consequently he generates
greater expected surplus than the non expert.
As an aside, it’s interesting to observe the ranking of information structures by MPS
of forecast distributions for our problem is formally similar to the ranking of information
structures in agency problems with moral hazard. Kim (95) demonstrates that an MPS
relation between the likelihood ratio distributions coming from the original information
system is suﬃcient for ordering of diﬀerent information structures in that setting.
More generally, Lemma 3 may be applied to settings other than forecasting, where sup-
pliers draw their costs from diﬀerent distributions. Suppose for instance, that supplier’s
actual costs (rather than forecast cost) are ˜ x. S u p p l i e r sh a v et h es a m ee xa n t ee x p e c t e d
cost, but their actual costs are obtained from distributions Fi (˜ x). Then lemma 3 implies
sellers drawing their cost from more diﬀuse distributions will earn greater expected surplus
for any feasible contract.10
3 Optimal Contracts
In this section we characterize optimal procurement contracts. Unlike previous studies (e.g.
Baron and Myerson (82)), though, we augment the analysis with the possibility that suppliers
vary by their ability to forecast costs. Our analysis demonstrates the interesting diﬀerences
in contract provisions that arise when suppliers are privately informed of their forecasting
skills.
9 We note that our ordering of forecasts structures can be shown to be a special case of Athey and Levin
(2000) who have derived a more general characterization for ranking information structures for the class of
monotone decision problems of which the supplier’s problem we consider is a special case.
10 This is consistent with Courty and Li ( 2000) who ﬁnd that buyers who have greater variation in demand
for services are willing to pay more for a purchasing contract than buyers with more predictable demand.
83.1 Framework
At the time of contracting, S privately knows his type, Se or Sn which reﬂects his forecasting
ability. The ex ante probability S is of type e is µ ∈ (0,1).S receives his forecast of cost
after the terms of the contract are set, and just prior to production. Under these conditions,
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subject to the contracting constraints for i = e,n:
(a) Ui
˜ x(˜ x | Mi)=−C (qi(˜ x))
(b) qi(˜ x) is non increasing
(c) Ui(Mi) ≥ 0
(d).Ui(Mi) ≥ Ui(Mj) for all i 6= j
Constraints (a)-(c) are required for contract feasibility. Constraint (d) insures sellers
truthfully report their types.
Before proceeding to the solution of (4) it is useful to characterize, as a benchmark,
the ﬁrst-best full information supply contract that maximizes the sum of buyer and seller
surplus, assuming the procurer can observe the forecaster’s type. Assuming a unique interior





























i (˜ x)=0 (6)
The optimal contract speciﬁes the quantity, qi∗ (˜ x),that equates the marginal value of service
to the marginal cost for each realization, ˜ x. The supplier receives expected payments equal
to expected cost for all realizations of ˜ x h ef o r e c a s t st oe n s u r eh eb r e a k se v e no na v e r a g e .
O n em a yi m p l e m e n tt h i sc o n t r a c ti nt w ow a y s . O n ei st oo ﬀer the supplier a payment
schedule equal to the marginal beneﬁt of service. This schedule will induce optimal supply for
each realization, ˜ x. Another more direct method is a "buy out" (e.g. Harris and Raviv (1979))
of the procurer by the forecaster. The forecaster purchases the buyer’s assets, (assuming
they’re transferable) and thereby becomes the residual claimant of all net surplus. This leads
the supplier to produce eﬃciently.
9A special case of interest arises when only the expert receives an informative signal, and
the non expert always forecasts, ˆ x, the ex ante mean cost. Previous studies (e.g. Cremer et
al (1998a)) and Lewis and Sappington(1993, 1994) have focused exclusively on this setting.
In this case the solution to the buyer’s problem is readily characterized in,
Proposition 1: When the non expert is completely uninformed the buyer implements the
ﬁrst best contract with
(a) {Tn (˜ x)=ˆ xC (q∗ (ˆ x)),qn (˜ x)=q∗ (ˆ x)} for ˜ x ∈ X
(b) {qe (˜ x)=q∗ (˜ x)} for ˜ x ∈ X and
R
X [Ti∗ (˜ x) − ˜ xC (qi∗ (˜ x))]dFi (˜ x)=0
Two interesting ﬁndings emerge from Proposition 1. One holds generally and the other
is speciﬁc to this setting. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is that the non expert is delegated less decision
making authority, than the expert. Here the non expert has only one choice, to supply
q∗ (ˆ x) where ˆ x is the ex ante expected unit cost of supply. More generally, when the non
expert receives some informative forecasts, we will continue to ﬁnd her purchase authority
is restricted relative to the expert’s. Second, the buyer is able to implement the ﬁrst best
allocation, without ceding any rent to the expert supplier The expert is precluded from earn-
ing rent because he is unable to use his superior forecasting abilities when the non expert’s
contract calls for a constant level of service. This result is special. As we demonstrate below
it does not generalize to settings where the non expert receives informative forecasts.
Now returning to the buyer’s problem for the general setting, we make the following
assumption for the rest of the analysis to follow (unless indicated otherwise)
Assumption: Continuous Distributions with Common Support (CDCS):
For i = e,n, F i(˜ x) is absolutely continuous and strictly increasing with density dF i (˜ x)=
fi (˜ x) > 0 for all ˜ x ∈ X.
CDSC implies that all suppliers receive the same set of forecasts, but with diﬀerent
frequencies. This enables us to analyze and interpret the optimal contracts more easily.







e (˜ x)) − T
e (˜ x))dF








10According to (7) the buyer selects services to maximize total net surplus minus the expected
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where the third line follows from the second by integrating by parts and recognizing the con-
straint in (d)b i n d sf o rSn. After substituting for the rent expression into (7) and rearranging
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Fe(˜ x) − Fn(˜ x)
fn(˜ x)
(11)
are the adjusted (for information rent) welfare expressions for the Se and Sn suppliers re-
spectively.
3.2 Characterization of Optimal Supply Contracts
The solution to (9) is characterized in the following Proposition (whose proof is in the ap-
pendix). To avoid unnecessary complications we assume the solution satisﬁes monotonicity,
constraint (b).11
Proposition 2: Given CDCS, in the solution to (9),q i (˜ x) = argmaxAW i (·) with
(a) V 0(qe(˜ x)) − ˜ xC0 (qe(˜ x)) = 0
11 We demonstrate in the appendix that the solution satisﬁes monotonicy whenever µ is not too large,
or the distribution functions Fi (˜ x) are suﬃciently similar so that
¯ ¯ ¯
F e(˜ x)−F n(˜ x)
fn(˜ x)
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¯ ¯ ¯are
small for all ˜ x ∈ X. When the monotonicity condition is violated, the quantity schedule undergoes an
ironing process, (see Rochet and Chone (98) for details), which restricts the schedule to being nonincreasing.
Although this alters the optimal supply schedule, it does not alter the qualitative properties of the optimal
contract.




fn(˜ x) )( = )if qn (˜ x) > 0.
(c) Un (Mn)=0 ,U e (Me) > 0
Proposition 2 indicates the optimal supply contract oﬀers the expert forecaster Se the
ﬁrst-best, surplus maximizing menu, M∗ a st h e r ei sn on e e dt od i s t o r ts e r v i c et or e d u c eh i s
rents. Se is delegated the choice of the eﬃcient level of service for each cost realization. This
contract is implemented either through a "buy out" of the buyer’s assets, or by oﬀering Se
the ﬁr s tb e s tm e n us a t i s f y i n g(5).
In contrast, part (b) indicates the non expert Sn is oﬀe r e dac o n t r a c tt h a td i s t o r t sh i s
supply choice. As usual with incentive contracts, these distortions are induced to mitigate
the expert’s incentive to misrepresent his forecasting ability. However, unlike the usual
Baron-Myerson type of quantity reducing distortions, here Sn0s supply is distorted above or
below eﬃcient levels depending on how likely it is that the expert Se would have forecast
a lower cost. The rationale for these distortions is that each supplier type earns rent from
their private knowledge of ˜ x, when they forecast cost. Increasing output for one realization
˜ x, increases the rent for all realizations ˜ x0 < ˜ x, since a supplier with costs ˜ x0 can claim
to have higher costs ˜ x and receive greater compensation. Thus, supplier type Si accrues
marginal information rents at the rate of C0 (qn(˜ x))Fi (˜ x) when he declares he is a non
expert. The diﬀerence between the expert’s and non expert’s marginal rent for some cost
˜ x is ∆R(qn (˜ x), ˜ x)=C0 (qn(˜ x))(Fe (˜ x) − Fn (˜ x)). Therefore to dissuade Se from imitating
Sn, the buyer lowers qn (x) for all ˜ x where ∆R(qn (˜ x), ˜ x) is positive and raises qn (x) for all
˜ x0 where ∆R(qn (˜ x0), ˜ x0) is negative.
To see more clearly how these distortions eﬀectively constrain the non expert’s supply
choice consider the following example.
Example 1: Suppose Fe (˜ x) is a single MPS of Fn (˜ x) such that Fe (˜ x) intersects Fn (˜ x)
once from above at some x0 ∈ (x, ¯ x). Roughly this implies the expert forecasts relatively
high or low costs more frequently than the non expert.
For this example Proposition 2 indicates that the relative service levels required for the

































Notice the expert is free to select the eﬃcient service level based on his forecast of cost. In
contrast the non expert is rationed when forecasts are low, and subsidized when forecasts
are high. The eﬀect of these distortions is to restrict the variation in service supplied by
the non expert. This is illustrated conceptually in Figure 1 below. The Figure shows how
the non expert supplies are concentrated around intermediate levels of service. Compared
to the expert the non expert is delegated less decision making authority. He is discouraged
from adjusting supply in response to updated information received from his forecast of costs.
This renders it less attractive for an expert to claim he is non expert, since his delegation
authority is reduced as a result.
3.3 Signaling of Forecasting Expertise
A ni m p o r t a n te l e m e n t ,t h a tw eh a v en o tm o d e l e d ,i st h ec a r e e rc o n c e r no ff o r e c a s t e r s .S u p -
pliers are compensated for their ability to predict costs and prescribe service for buyers.
If possible, suppliers will try to establish a reputation as an expert for future employers.
Our ﬁndings imply that experts will prescribe varying service levels. Therefore non experts
may artiﬁcially vary their recommendations, when such prescriptions are unwarranted, to
signal they are experts. Similar incentives for experts to modify forecasts to signal ability in
other settings are noted by Prendergast and Stole (96), Ottaviani and Sorenson (2000) and
13Dewatrixpont et al (1999). The signalling of expertise by manipulating forecast will impose
coordination costs on the non expert. With randomly forecasting he will occasionally supply
l a r g eq u a n t i t i e sw h e nr e a lc o s t sa r eh i g h ,a n ds m a l la m o u n t sw h e nr e a lc o s t sa r el o w .
3.4 Implication for Combining Prescription with Supply
The conventional wisdom that it is beneﬁcial for buyers to obtain diagnosis and supply of
service from independent parties is not borne out here. By bundling the prescription and
provision of services with one supplier, the buyer is able to screen experts from non experts
more easily. As we demonstrated above the buyer oﬀers diﬀerent supply schedules that aﬀord
varying degrees of delegation authority according to the supplier’s reported expertise. This
will induce suppliers with diﬀerent abilities to select distinct contracts. This self selection
is not possible if diagnosis is independent of supply. In that case the buyer is unable to
verify the accuracy of the forecaster without observing actual production costs.12 Naturally
though, it may be preferable to separate diagnosis from supply provided production costs
can be observed.13
3.5 Implication for Acquisition of Expertise and Firm Boundaries
Our analysis to this point has assumed a supplier is exogenously endowed with expertise.
In reality, suppliers may need to invest resources to acquire expertise. Suppliers will only
acquire additional information if the rewards from being a better forecaster yield a high
enough return to their investment. Suppose, for instance, that a supplier must invest I>0
to become a expert and that the buyer is unable to observe this investment. Then for any
feasible contract {T (˜ x),q(˜ x)} the seller is oﬀered, the additional surplus, RI (T (˜ x),q(˜ x)),
from being an expert (instead of a non expert) is,
RI (T (˜ x),q(˜ x)) =
Z
X
(T (˜ x) − ˜ xC (q(˜ x)))(dF






e (˜ x) − F
n (˜ x))d˜ x (13)
12 Our ﬁndings suggest one rationale for bundling tasks. There are other reasons as well. When multiple
complementary products are to be supplied, a double marginalization of information rents is avoided by
assigning production to a single supplier. See Baron and Besanko (1992) and Gilbert and Riordan (1995)
13 See Lewis and Sappington (1997).
14where the second line of (13) follows from the ﬁrst after integrating by parts. A buyer wishing
to purchase from an expert supplier must oﬀer a supply contract {T (˜ x),q(˜ x)} providing
suﬃcient reward for the seller to invest in expertise. This requires RI (T (˜ x),q(˜ x)) ≥ I.





(V (q(˜ x)) − T (˜ x))dF
e (14)
subject to {T (˜ x),q(˜ x)} being feasible and RI (T (˜ x),q(˜ x)) ≥ I. Employing familiar argu-
ments from analysis of Proposition 2, one can show the optimal contract in (14) is character-
ized by the following, (where ρ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier attached to RI (T (˜ x),q(˜ x))−
I ≥ 0)
Proposition 3: In the solution to (14)
(a) V 0(q(˜ x)) − ˜ xC0 (q(˜ x))) ≤− ρC0 (q(˜ x))(
Fe(˜ x)−Fn(˜ x)
fe(˜ x) ) ; (=) if q(˜ x) > 0,
(b) RI (T (˜ x),q(˜ x)) ≥ I ,ρ ≥ 0
Proof: The proof, which follows Proposition 2, is omitted.
The optimal contract in Proposition 3 calls for too much output when Fe (˜ x)−Fn (˜ x) > 0
and too little output when Fe (˜ x) − Fn (˜ x) < 0. These distortions provide the necessary
reward for the seller to acquire forecasting skill. To understand this recall the diﬀerence in
the rate experts and non experts acquire rent is ∆R(q(˜ x,)˜ x)=C0 (q(˜ x))(Fe(˜ x) − Fn(˜ x)).
Therefore the reward from investing in expertise comes from increasing supply when the
expert’s marginal rent diﬀerence is positive, and by decreasing it when the rent diﬀerence is
negative.
This suggests ﬁrms will contract out for those services that are most diﬃcult to prescribe.
The core of our argument is that arrangements involving expost ineﬃciencies are required
to induce suppliers to gain expertise. Such arrangements are more diﬃcult to enforce within
a ﬁrm, than when the ﬁrm contracts outside for supply. To induce an internal division in
the ﬁrm to acquire expertise, requires a distortion of the supply allocation so that it is ex
post ineﬃcient. There is ample evidence and compelling arguments (e.g.Williamson (75)) to
suggest that ineﬃcient arrangements between internal divisions of a ﬁrm are more diﬃcult to
enforce than contracts with outside parties. This is because renegotiation of ineﬃcient terms
occurs more readily within a ﬁrm, than when the arrangement is between separate entities
contracting at arms length. We conclude these types of expost ineﬃcient arrangements will
15likely transcend the boundary of the ﬁrm. Firms will be more likely to self provide products
not requiring expert diagnosis.
4 Buyer’s Preferences for Contracting with Expert Fore-
casters
What are the buyer’s preferences for contracting with sellers having diﬀerent diagnostic
abilities? The answer depends on two factors. The ﬁrst is the timing of contracting. Are
contracts negotiated sequentially or only after experts have observed costs? Second, is the
seller aware of his forecasting ability ex ante?
4.1 Buyer Preferences for Contracting with Informed Sellers
Suppose suppliers know their forecasting abilities ex ante. An expert forecaster can perform
more eﬀectively for the buyer by recognizing opportunities to provide greater service when
costs are small. However this advantage may be negated by the increased information rents
the expert commands. To investigate this trade-oﬀ we deﬁne a forecaster of type µ, Sµ as one
who draws the expert distribution, Fe,with probability µ and the non expert distribution,
Fn, with probability 1−µ. We assume B knows only the likelihood, µ, that the seller is an
expert at the time of contracting.
4.1.1 Sequential Contracting
To illustrate the importance of the timing of negotiations, ﬁrst consider the sequential con-
tract setting. Deﬁne W(µ) to be the buyer’s expected utility from contracting with seller
type Sµ as,















where AWi, the adjusted welfare expression for Si,i sg i v e ni n(10) and (11)
Lemma 4 characterizes a key property of W(µ).
Lemma 4: W(µ) is convex.
























































































where the second line follows because AW n is decreasing in µ, the third line is implied
by the fact qe
1 and qn
0 maximize AW e and AW n r e s p e c t i v e l y ,a n dt h el a s tl i n ef o l l o w s
after some rearranging of terms. QED
Suppose µ =0so the seller draws distribution Fn with certainty. The eﬀect on B0s




























































where the third line follows after integrating by parts and recognizing qe
0 = qn
0.Q E D
Combining Lemma 4 and (18), we can establish :
Proposition 4 W(µ) is increasing in µ. Buyers prefer contracting with sellers who are
more likely to be experts.
T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rP r o p o s i t i o n4i st h a tB prefers contracting with experts, because of the
ﬁrst order eﬀect that they generate greater total surplus for the buyer and seller to split.
This is partially negated by the fact that seller’s earn greater proﬁts when they are well
17informed. Infact one can readily show when buyers employ the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient contract,
that W0(µ)=0as the supplier captures all the additional surplus from being a better
forecaster. However, by distorting contracts to reduce information rents, the buyer manages
to capture some portion of the beneﬁts of better forecasting for himself.
4.1.2 Contracting After Costs are Known
Now to highlight the importance of contract timing in shaping buyer preferences we turn
to a setting where contracting occurs after the supplier observes his forecast. In this case
the buyer can do no better than to oﬀer a single schedule {T (˜ x),q(˜ x)}. Otherwise the
supplier will just select the schedule containing his best option given his cost, ˜ x,when multiple
schedules are oﬀered.14 Further, to guarantee the supplier produces, he must earn positive
surplus whatever his cost.
Under these conditions the buyer may prefer contracting with a non expert. To illustrate,
suppose costs ˜ x ∈ {xL,x H} are "low" or "high" with probability 1
2. Assume buyer’s surplusis
V (q)=( a−bq)q and the seller’s costs C (˜ x,q)=˜ xq where a,b > 0. Further suppose xH <a
so it is eﬃcient to produce at all costs. The non expert always forecasts the ex ante expected
cost ˆ x =
xH+xL
2 . The expert forecasts actual costs.
Suppose the buyer knows the seller’s forecasting ability. Then when contracting with a
non expert the buyer optimally oﬀers a single take it or leave it contract
©




The non expert accepts this contract and breaks even on average. The buyer acquires a net
surplus V (qn) − Tn =
(a−ˆ x)2
4b with this arrangement.
When dealing with an expert, the buyer optimally oﬀers a single take it or leave it
contract
©




provided a ≤ 2xH − xL.15 The expert accepts this contract
whenever his costs are xL .Otherwise when costs are high he rejects it. The buyer’s expected
surplus from this arrangement is V (qe) − Te =
(a−xL)2
8b .








2−1) ≤ a. In this the buyer earns a greater surplus contracting with the non expert.
Although the expert can tailor production to cost conditions, it’s too costly to induce him
14 That is when several schedules
©
Ti (˜ x),qi (˜ x)
ª
for i =1 ,2,,N are oﬀered, a supplier will select the
schedule j such that Tj(˜ x),qj (˜ x) = argmaxT,q,xTi (˜ x) − ˜ xqi (˜ x). So without loss of generality the buyer
may consolidate these choices by simply oﬀering the schedule T (˜ x),q(˜ x) = argmaxT,q,xTi (˜ x)− ˜ xqi (˜ x) for
all ˜ x.
15 When the buyer induces the expert to produce q when ˜ x = xH he earns extra net surplus equal to
(a − bq)q − xHq − (xH − xL)q. The last term is the information rent the expert earns. This expression is
negative for all q ≥ 0 provided a ≤ 2xH − xL.
18to produce when costs are high. In contrast, the non expert supplies the buyer under
all conditions. Therefore when the buyer’s value of consumption, a, is large compared to
variations in cost, xH − xL, he derives greater value from the non expert supplier. This
follows because the beneﬁt of predicting cost to adjust production is small when there is
little variation in costs. However the beneﬁt from always being supplied is high.
Comparing the buyer’s preferences in this setting with his preferences in the sequential
contracting setting reveal the important beneﬁts of gradual contracting. It’s more diﬃcult
to control experts’ rents when they are fully informed at contracting time. At this point
the buyer can only oﬀer a single contract, and suppliers must always expect positive proﬁts,
otherwise they will not produce. The expert’s ability to extract large rents is greater here
than when contracting is sequential and the buyer can employ more instruments to limit
experts’ rents. In that case, a supplier need only break even on average to insure he produces.
And diﬀerent ability suppliers are managed under separate contracts. This allows the buyer
to tailor agreements to the supplier’s type, so that expert advice is more valuable to the
buyer under these conditions.
4.2 Buyer’s Preference for Ex Ante Knowledge of Seller
According to Proposition 4, B prefers contracting with more capable forecasters. But this
presumes sellers know their forecasting ability ex ante. Suppose instead, the seller is un-
certain whether he is an expert or nonexpert predictor of the buyer’s costs. Would the
buyer prefer contracting with a forecaster who is uncertain of his predictive abilities? This
questions is not entirely academic, as settings exist where the buyer may oﬀer or conceal in-
formation regarding the service he desires that would inform the seller about his forecasting
ability.16
To pursue this question we compare the buyer’s expected utility when contracting with
an informed seller, W(µ) deﬁned in (18), with his expected utility contracting with an
uninformed seller, Wu(µ),d e ﬁned by,
W




V (q(˜ x)) − ˜ xC(q(˜ x))(µdF
e +( 1− µ)dF
n). (19)
Without knowing whether he is an expert or nonexpert, the uninformed seller’s prior on his
16 As an example, the procurer of health care services may provide or conceal information on the demo-
graphic characteristics of the patient population that would inform the provider about the likely costs of
treatment.
19distribution is the mixture µF e+(1−µ)Fn. Accordingly, B designs a quantity menu, {q}, to
maximize expected utility given the seller’s perceived forecast distribution (µdF e +( 1− µ)dF n.
The buyer’s preferences depend on how valuable the expert’s information is for planning
production. To illustrate, imagine Fe(˜ x) is the expert’s signal distribution and suppose there
exists a much less informative distribution, e F(˜ x), providing such poor information that the





(V (q(˜ x)) − ˜ xC(q(˜ x)))de F(˜ x) ≤ 0 (20)
Let F n
λ = λF e +( 1− λ)e F represent the second, less informative distribution S may draw.
This distribution is a mixture of Fe and e F with the weight, λ ∈ [0,1] being the measure of
similarity between the informative and uninformative information structures. For λ close to
1 there is little additional information gained from structure Fe, whereas there is signiﬁcant
information gained from structure Fe when λ is close to 0. Employing this gauge of the
value of a better forecast permits us to partially characterize B0s preferences.
Proposition 5: There exists a λH and λL satisfying 0 <λ L <λ H < 1 such that
(a) B prefers contracting with an uninformed seller for λ ≥ λH and,
(b) B prefers contracting with an informed seller for λ ≤ λL.
The buyer faces a trade oﬀ between reducing information rent and increasing allocative
eﬃciency. When the seller is informed, the buyer could increase eﬃciency by oﬀering the
expert forecaster Se am o r eﬂexible supply schedule. However, Se would capture rents from
his private knowledge. When a seller is uninformed the buyer cannot tailor the supply
schedule to the quality of his information. Nonetheless, the buyer may fully extract the
seller’s expected rents.
When λ is close to 1, there is little diﬀerence between the expert and non expert infor-
mation structures. The eﬃciency gained from an informed seller is small compared to the
additional rent the seller captures. Thus B prefers contracting with an uninformed seller.
When λ is close to 0, the expert forecasts are much more informative than the non expert
forecasts. Performance improves signiﬁcantly by knowing the quality of the seller’s informa-
tion. Further, the rents an informed expert may command are small, since the buyer may
credibly commit not to employ a seller who declares he is a non expert. In this case, the
buyer prefers informed sellers.
17 This would arise if there were ﬁxed costs to employing the supplier.
205C o n c l u s i o n
Most studies of optimal procurement presume the seller is privately and perfectly informed
of his costs at the time of contracting. In contrast this paper explores how contracts are
optimally planned and designed for suppliers with diﬀerent expertise who acquire informa-
tion gradually over time. We have discovered interesting variations in contracts arise when
suppliers diﬀer in their ability to prescribe service. For instance we show experts receive
more varied forecasts of costs than non experts. The supply schedules oﬀered to the ex-
pert and non expert diﬀer by the ability of the expert to adjust supply to diﬀerent forecast
costs. Fitting supply schedules to the relative frequency of cost forecasts mitigates the sup-
plier’s incentives to misrepresent his ability to prescribe service. Further we ﬁnd buyers are
more likely to beneﬁt from delegating decisions to suppliers, when they can tailor supply
agreements to the seller’s level of expertise.
While our analysis suggests some ways that the quality of advice may be accounted for in
supply contracts, we have ignored or barely mentioned several other potentially important
factors that may shape the procurement process. For example accounting for the career con-
cerns of experts in the optimal design of purchase arrangements warrants further attention.
It would also be useful to more carefully explore what factors, other than supplier expertise,
determine a ﬁrm’s decision to outsource. 18The strategic disclosure of pre-contracting infor-
mation also warrants investigation. The rationale for buyer’s to withhold information from
suppliers may fruitfully be analyzed in the context of our model.
Our central insights about contracting with experts may be relevant for the design of op-
timal procurement auctions. For example, suppliers bidding to acquire the rights to develop
a mineral deposit or an oil ﬁeld are likely to vary in their ability to forecast value. Our model
suggests that the handicapping of bidders by ability and the strategic disclosure of pre bid in-
formation are two instruments sellers may use to maximize their expected revenues.19 Other
prescriptions for designing optimal selling mechanism ranging from decentralized auctions
to bilaterally negotiated agreements may be addressed by our model as well.
18 For instance the ability of the ﬁrm to observe inputs or output from production may inﬂuence it’s
decision to outsource. Khalil and Lawaree (1995) provide an interesting analysis of the relative advantages
of monitoring outputs.
19 The impact of bidders with unknown abilities to predict value in First-Price Auctions is explored by
Piccione and Tan (1996) Other analysis of the beneﬁts of informing agents about their valuations include
Persico(2000) and Ottaviani and Prat (2001).
216 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
The necessary ﬁrst-order conditions for problem (9)a r eg i v e nb y(a) and (b) of Propo-
sition 2 in the text. These conditions are also suﬃcient provided AW n is strictly quasai




fn(˜ x) i sn o tt o ol a r g ei na b s o l u t ev a l u ef o r˜ x ∈ [x, ¯ x].
This same condition insures the solution identiﬁed in (a) and (b) of Proposition 2 satisﬁes
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fn(˜ x) is not too large.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
Part (a)
Let Wu
λ(µ) and Wλ(µ) represent B0s expected surplus when contracting with an unin-
formed and informed seller respectively, given Fn








[V (q(˜ x)) − ˜ xC(q(˜ x))]dF
e(˜ x)+( 1− µ)
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is continuous and d
dλ (Wu





λ(µ) − Wλ(µ)) < 0 (A6)











0 > 0 (A7)







































λ(µ) is convex. Further, when the seller is informed about his information struc-
ture,
Wλ(µ) ≥ µWλ (1), (A9)
as the buyer can always ensure µWλ (1) by oﬀering a contract that only a seller with better
information will supply. Therefore we have,
W
u
0 (µ) <µ W
u








where the ﬁrst line follows from the convexity of Wu
λ(µ), the second line follows from Wu
0 (0) =
W0(0) = 0, the third line follows from the fact that Wu
λ(1) = Wλ(1).and the fourth line
follows from (A9). Thus, since Wu
λ(µ) and Wλ(µ) are continuous in λ,t h e r ee x i s t saλ
L
suﬃciently close to 0 such that Wλ(µ) >W u
λ(µ) for all λ ≤ λ
L. QED
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